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NORTHWEST PASSAGE - TRADE ROUTE FOR LARGE AIR-CUSHION VEHICLES
by John L Anderson
Lewis Research Center
SUMMARY
For nearly 500 years seafaring nations of the North Atlantic have searched for a
Northwest Passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
This report identifies a conceptual vehicle and powerplant (a 9070-metric-ton
(10 000-ton) nuclear-powered air-cushion vehicle) that could open the Northwest Passage
and other Arctic passages to commercial traffic. The deciding characteristic of an air-
cushion vehicle (ACV) is its ability to go over water, land, and ice; whereas a displace-
ment ship is restricted to deep water and must impact the ice and withstand enormous
ice pack pressures.
The conceptual ACV freighter has a flat-bed design which would allow it to carry a
variety of cargo, such as containers, vehicles, and even modular buildings. The
freighter would be 87 meters (290 ft) long, 61 meters (200 ft) wide, and have a flexible
skirt 6 meters (20 ft) high. Fully loaded, the freighter would weigh 9070 metric tons,
o
60 percent of which would be cargo, and would have a cushion pressure of 19 200 N/m
o(400 Ib/ft ). Its power source would be a 2300-megawatt, gas-cooled, unit-shielded
thermal reactor. The freighter could cross crevices 27 meters (88 ft) wide, waves
6 meters (20 ft) high, and solid obstacles 5 meters (16 ft) high and would cruise at
185 km/hr (100 knots) on the open sea and 110 km/hr (60 knots) over ice and tundra.
It would operate between North Atlantic and North Pacific ports over two different
Arctic routes - a Northwest Passage and a North Polar Passage.
In addition to a description of the conceptual vehicle and its powerplant and oper-
ations, this report contains an assessment of technical feasibility, estimates of capital
and operating costs, and identification of eligible cargo and markets. It also includes a
comparison of distance, cost, and time for ACV freighters with that for nuclear-
powered container ships, which will likely be operating in the same time period that
ACV freighters could be - 1985 to 2000.
Some of the incentives for development of a nuclear-powered ACV freighter for a
Northwest Passage are (1) greatly reduced transit time on many East-West trade mis-
sions; (2) competitive cost with conventional shipping for containerizable and roll-on/
roll-off cargo; (3) independence from the Panama and Suez Canels; (4) applicability of
the freighter concept to transportation needs throughout the world; (5) potential world-
wide marketability of the ACV freighter; and (6) the Arctic-wide, all-season mobility of
the freighter, which could also allow extraction of the vast mineral and fuel resources
in the Arctic and thus stimulate settlement and development there.
INTRODUCTION
For nearly 500 years seafaring nations of the North Atlantic have searched for a
Northwest Passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Such a passage through the
Canadian Arctic Islands would indeed be a high prize because it would nearly halve the
shipping distance between ports of the North Atlantic and the Orient, even with the
Panama and Suez (when open) Canals available. Several possible Northwest or Arctic
passages are indicated in figure 1, which is a map of the "top of the world." This map
is derived from reference 1, which is a description of Arctic passages.
The first transit of a Northwest Passage was made by the Norwegian explorer,
Roald Amundsen (who also discovered the South Pole), on a 3-year trip between 1903 and
1906. Since that time, several vessels have made passages over various routes.
The first commercial transit of a Northwest Passage was made by the icebreaker-
tanker Manhattan in the fall of 1969 (ref. 2). The Manhattan sought to demonstrate the
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Figure 1. - Several possible Northwester Arctic passages.
potential of large icebreaking ships for carrying oil from the Alaskan North Slope to the
U.S. East Coast. The Manhattan carried one symbolic gilded barrel of oil from the
Atlantic Ocean to Point Barrow, Alaska, and back to the Atlantic Ocean over the
southernmost route shown in figure 1. However, that experience indicated that an
icebreaker-tanker for year-round Arctic operation would require an even stronger hull
and more powerful engines than the Manhattan. Thus, the resulting high cost of any
icebreaking displacement ship would make this method of Arctic passage uneconomical.
Submarines, of course, would not require this icebreaking capability. The possible
commercial use of nuclear cargo submarines that would make an Arctic Passage under
the ice has been discussed in references 1 and 3. This transit capability was first dem-
onstrated by the nuclear submarine Nautilus, which passed under the North Pole in 1958.
A Northeast Passage across the top of Eurasia has been used by Russia for many
years. This passage is kept open as long as 150 days a year by a fleet of icebreakers,
one of which is the nuclear-powered Lenin. However, international use of this passage
has been hampered by territorial limit disputes (ref. 1).
Economic trends of the past two decades make a Northwest, or more generally, an
Arctic Passage increasingly attractive. During this time a "world" economy that is in-
creasingly dependent on international trade has developed. The projected growth of this
world economy (fig. 2) will require a new international cargo transportation capability
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Figure 2. - Oceanborne-trade forecast.
with shorter transit times and higher productivity than at present. (A discussion of how
international cargo transportation relates to interacting national economies is given in
ref. 4.) This capability can be provided for East-West trade between North Pacific and
North Atlantic ports by air-cushion vehicles using Arctic passages.
The purpose of this report is to identify a conceptual vehicle, a 9070-metric-ton
(10 000-ton) nuclear-powered air-cushion vehicle, that could open the Northwest Passage
and other Arctic passages to commercial traffic and to describe its implications. The
unique characteristic of an air-cushion vehicle (ACV), of course, is its ability to go over
water, land, and ice; whereas a displacement ship is restricted to deep water and must
impact the ice and withstand enormous ice pack pressure. Conceptual designs and im-
plications of nuclear ACV's have been described previously in references 5 to 11, and
those of large chemically powered ACV's in references 10 and 12 to 14.
Nuclear power, rather than chemical, is chosen for this study for three main rea-
sons.
(1) Although chemically powered ACV's might be used initially for some Arctic
routes, the fuel needed for a nonstop trans-Arctic capability (about 7400 km, or
4000 n mi) displaces a substantial amount of payload. Previous studies have indicated
that nuclear-powered ACV's could carry freight more cheaply than nonstop chemically
powered ACV's at distances greater than 3700 kilometers (about 2000 n mi) and that the
nuclear ACV economic advantage would improve for greater ranges (ref. 8). Arctic re-
fueling stations would increase the payload capability, but they would also increase the
ACV system operating and capital costs.
(2) The topography and behavior of Arctic ice are not well known. Even once they
are known and a trade route is selected, their variable nature may require Arctic ACV's
to detour frequently around high ice obstacles such as 7-meter (23-ft) pressure ridges or
20-meter (65-ft) "verticals" (upended ice slabs). Nuclear-powered ACV's would have
the reserve endurance for detouring with no penalty of payload reduction.
(3) The fuel autonomy of nuclear powerplants will make the complex and difficult
logistics of fuel supply in such a hostile and remote region unnecessary.
Thus, although large chemically powered ACV's might open the Northwest Passage,
they probably will serve only in a limited capacity. Nuclear-powered ACV's, on the
other hand, offer the important incentives of nonstop port-to-port, as well as trans-
Arctic, capability at lower cost and with fuel autonomy in the remote Arctic region.
Thus, they will probably be necessary for large-scale, long-term operations.
This report contains a description of the conceptual vehicle, including its nuclear
powerplant and operations, an assessment of its technical feasibility, estimates of the
capital and operating costs, and identification of eligible cargo and markets. It also in-
cludes a comparison of distance, cost, and time for ACV freighters with that for
nuclear-powered container ships, which will likely be operating in the same time period
that ACV freighters could be - 1985 to 2000.
Portions of the information about ACV design and costs, Arctic conditions and
shipping environment, and container ship specifications and costs were derived from
conversations with Bell Aerosystems, Inc.; the Cleveland Port Authority (Trade Devel-
opment Department); Arctic Systems, Ltd.; and Sea-Land Service, Inc.
DESCRIPTION OF THE AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER
The great advantage of an air-cushion vehicle is that it can go over Arctic ice; a
displacement ship must go through or around the ice. An ACV could, in fact, cross most
of the terrains that characterize the Arctic: open water, broken ice, tundra, and pack
ice with ridges and crevices.
Vehicle
One flexible-skirt design that can give an ACV its mobility is shown in figures 3
and 4. This is the single-skirt - peripheral-jet concept of the British (ref. 15). How-
ever, the multiple-skirt concept (fig. 5) of the French (refs. 16 and 17) could also have
been used.
The flat-bed design of a 9070-metric-ton (10 000-ton) nuclear ACV freighter is
shown in figure 6; its specifications are given in table I. The flat-bed design allows the
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Figure 3. - Air-cushion-vehicle peripheral-jet - single-flexible-skirt principle.
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Figure 5. - Air-cushion-vehicle multiple-flexible-skirt principle.
TABLE I. - SPECIFICATIONS OF NUCLEAR AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER
Weight, metric tons (tons):
Gross 9070(10 000)
Structure 2270(2500)
Engine 190(210)
Emergency fuel 585(645)
-Reactor core 105(115)
Reactor shield 490(540)
Payload 5430(5990)
Operating parameters:
Base pressure, N/m2(lb/ft2) 19 200(400)
Daylight clearance, cm(in.) 7.6(3)
Velocity, km/hr(knots) 185(100)
Emergency chemical range, km(n mi) 925(500)
Power:
Lift/drag ratio 16
Specific fuel consumption, kg/kw-hr(lb/hp-hr) 0.213(0.35)
Thrust/shaft-horsepower ratio, N/kW(lb/hp) 9.75(1.64)
Shaft horsepower, MW(hp) 569(763 000)
Thermal efficiency 0.25
Reactor thermal power, MW 2277
Dimensions, m(ft):
Length 87.4(290)
Breadth 61.0(200)
Rigid-structure height 10.1(33)
Flexible-skirt height 6.1(20)
Cushion area 83.9 by 56.4(275 by 185)
.2
g
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freighter to carry a variety of cargo, such as containers, vehicles, and even modular
buildings. The cargo area would be covered by contoured fiberglass or aluminum sec-
tions when underway to improve the aerodynamic profile and to protect the cargo. This
contoured covering is shown in figure 7, which is an artist's rendering of an earlier con-
ceptual ACV freighter (ref. 9) weighing 4535 metric tons (5000 tons).
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Figure 7. - 4500-Metric-ton (5000-ton), nuclear air-cushion-vehicle freighter.
Fully loaded, the ACV freighter of this study would weigh 9070 metric tons (10 000
2 2tons) and have a cushion pressure of 19 200 N/m (400 Ib/ft ). The freighter would be
87 meters (290 ft) long, 61 meters (200 ft) wide, and have a flexible skirt 6 meters
(20 ft) high. It would carry about 5400 metric tons (6000 tons) of cargo and cruise at
185 km/hr (100 knots) over water and at 111 km/hr (60 knots) over ice. It could cross
deep crevices 27 meters (88 ft) wide, waves 6 meters (20 ft) high, and solid obstacles
5 meters (16 ft) high. A later section, ARCTIC ROUTES, discusses the ice obstacle
heights likely to be encountered.
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Power System
A schematic of the power system is shown in figure 8. Air for the cushion and for
propulsion enters through louvers on the top of the craft. The air is pressurized by the
fans and then passed over condensers which contain the turbine exhaust steam. The
warmed, pressurized air from the lift fans goes into a plenum from which it is dis-
tributed to the peripheral jets.
Airflow
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.TT:..,^  ..- '• Containment
vessel and shield
Figure 8. - Schematic drawing of steam turbine drive for lift fan.
The power for this ACV freighter could be supplied by a 2300-megawatt, gas-cooled
thermal reactor and steam turbine system. Under normal operation the steam comes
from a boiler heated by the hot gas from the reactor. After a reactor shutdown, steam
would be generated in a chemically fired boiler. The freighter will carry enough reserve
chemical fuel for a 925-kilometer (500-n mi) range at reduced speed.
The reactor core is shielded by a combination of borated water and tungsten or de-
pleted uranium metal (fig. 9) (refs. 18 and 19). The outer diameter of the shield would
be from 7 to 9 meters (about 25 to 30 ft). Just outside the shield the radiation level
would be reduced to the maximum permissible general-population level, 0.25 millirem
per hour.
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Figure 9. - Schematic drawing of a helium-cooled reactor for mobile applications.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF LARGE NUCLEAR-POWERED
AIR-CUSHION VEHICLES
Nuclear ACV freighters will require development in two major areas: large ACV's
with both Arctic and ocean capability, and lightweight mobile nuclear powerplants. Sum-
marized below is the state of the art in each of these areas.
The largest operational ACV's (in use since 1971) are 225-metric-ton non-self-
propelled transporters used for carrying construction equipment in Arctic oil fields
(ref. 20). However, most of the operational experience for ACV's of about this size
comes from the 152-metric-ton SR.N4 hovercraft (fig. 10) (ref. 15). These hovercraft
have been in ferry operation across the English Channel since 1968 and have proved to be
both reliable and technically and economically practical.
Two 90-metric-ton surface-effect ships (hybrid ACV's that are restricted to water)
will undergo sea trials in 1972. These vehicles are prototypes of larger surf ace-effect
10
Figure 10. - British Hovercraft Ltd. SR. N4 air-cushion vehicle.
ships (destroyer size, weighing 2000 metric tons) to be built for the U.S. Navy by 1977.
At least two other military development programs are underway: a 145-metric-ton am-
phibious assault landing craft for the Navy, and an Arctic-based ACV (as large as
900 metric tons) for the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Furthermore, on the
civilian side, Arctic Systems, Ltd., may soon begin construction of a 2700-metrie-ton
transporter. ACV's above 3000 metric tons have only been studied conceptually (refs. 6
to 9 and 12 to 14). But according to ACV builders there appear to be no technical limita-
tions to building "10 000 tonners" or even larger ones.
As for the Arctic capability, ACV's (mostly flat-bed) for carrying oil rigs, construc-
tion equipment, and other loads in the Arctic are now being studied (ref. 21), tested
(refs. 22 and 23), and used (ref. 20). An assessment of the potential of small ACV's as a
transportation system for the North Canadian and Arctic environments is given in refer-
ence 24.
A mobile nuclear powerplant for an ACV will be more difficult to develop than exist-
ing land-based and marine nuclear reactors because it must be more compact, weigh
much less, and be safe if involved in an impact accident. The technology for an ACV
reactor may come partly from land-based, high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors
(which entered the commercial market in 1971); partly from nuclear space power sys-
tems which have development goals for both reactors and power conversion systems of
compactness, lightweight, and reliability; and partly from an airborne nuclear power-
plant technology program at NASA's Lewis Research Center that has stressed high-
burnup fuel pins, optimized shield design, and impact and meltdown safety.
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In particular, the lightweight/compactness feasibility has been suggested by ana-
lytical studies which indicate that current ship-reactor weight may be reduced by at
least a factor of 10 and that the reactor and shield could be enclosed in a spherical con-
tainment vessel less than 9 meters (30 ft) in diameter (ref. 18).
The safety problem of preventing radioactivity release as a result of an ACV impact
accident is a critical one. In fact, of all the technological problems of an airborne re-
actor, impact safety has the biggest question mark. Although there are indications that
impact safety may be feasible, there are many difficult technology steps between these
indications and demonstrated feasibility. Nonetheless conceptual safety solutions have
been suggested and are outlined here.
There are two stages of an impact accident. First, the kinetic energy of the
reactor - shield - containment-vessel (RSCV) system must be absorbed during the im-
pact without rupturing the containment vessel. Second, after the impact, the thermal
energy from decaying fission products must be transferred from the RSCV system with-
out rupturing the containment vessel.
Safety during an accident will also require prevention of uncontrolled criticality.
This might be accomplished by designing the reactor so it can be made subcritical by
poison addition or moderator removal. Radar sensing of impending impacts would auto-
matically activate these safety measures, as well as close and seal all penetrations of
the containment vessel. The process of sensing the need for a reactor shutdown and then
preparing the reactor system for an impact must be nearly foolproof. It should be just
as reliabile as sensing and shutdown processes for land-based nuclear electric gener-
ating plants. The reactor must also remain completely sealed during and after the im-
pact to prevent sea water from flooding the core and conceivably restoring criticality
and to prevent fission product release.
Two techniques for kinetic energy absorption have been examined in the technology
program at Lewis. One technique would surround the containment vessel with material
configurations that are highly energy absorbing, such as balsa wood, frangible tubes,
or metal or plastic honeycomb. This technique appears reasonable for impact veloci-
ties to about 100 m/sec (about 200 knots).
The other energy-absorbing technique examined has been simply the deformation of
the containment vessel and its contents. In fact, the RSCV system would be designed so
that all parts of the system would serve multiple purposes, one of which would be to ab-
sorb kinetic energy. Simulated RSCV's (0.6-m- (2-ft-) diameter models weighing about
450 kg (1000 Ib) each) have impacted concrete at velocities of 195, 320, and 332 m/sec
(640, 1055, and 1090 ft/sec) without rupturing. Earlier tests at lower velocities are
described in reference 25.
After an impact a second stage of the accident safety problem would occur. To
overcome this, the reactor and safety system must be designed so that the heat from de-
caying fission products will not melt through the containment vessel. One approach to
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this problem is to provide enough impact energy absorber around the RSCV to ensure
that the shutdown cooling system will function after an impact. Another approach is to
design an RSCV which will permit the core to melt without melting through the contain-
ment vessel. Preliminary studies indicate that for the ACV both of these approaches are
feasible in principle.
COSTS FOR THE AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER
Because ACV's of several thousand metric tons have only been studied conceptually,
the extrapolation of design, construction, operational, and cost data from about 200 to
9000 metric tons must be recognized as only an estimate.
Capital Cost
i
A summary of capital costs is given in table II (all costs are given in current dol-
lars). The development cost for a chemically powered ACV (vehicle, propulsion sys-
TABLE II. - CAPITAL COSTS OF NUCLEAR AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER3
Development
Average development0
First unit
Average unit
Average unit and development share
Average freighter
Air-cushion vehicle
and chemical
powerplant backup
Nuclear
powerplant
Cost, millions of dollars
150
1.5
65
e37.7
39.2
b500
(b)
d!3.4
f!0.3
b!0.3
49.5
f
Gross weight, 9070 metric tons.
It is assumed that reactor development cost will be borne by the U.S.
government.
"Based on 100-unit production series.
Includes $5.4 million for a water-depleted uranium shield and $8.0
million for reactor vessel, core structure, and in-core controls.
Nuclear fuel cost is not included.
"Based on a 90-percent learning factor applicable to the entire 100-unit
production.
Based on a 93-percent learning factor applicable to the first 15 reactors;
the cost of the 16th to the 100th reactors is the same as the cost of the
15th one.
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tern, and nuclear-to-chemical switching capability) is estimated at $150 million. The
development cost of the nuclear powerplant (about $500 million) is assumed to be borne
entirely by the U.S. Government in view of their previous support of nuclear power re-
search and development, the potential applications and benefits (ref. 11), and the likeli-
hood that no private company could afford it.
The cost of the first ACV (not included in the development cost) is estimated to be
about $65 million. The cost of the first reactor, $13.4 million, taken from reference 8,
includes the shield cost of $5.4 million and the reactor vessel, core structure, and in-
core controls cost of $8.0 million but does not include fuel-element cost.
However, the cost of a production unit decreases as the cumulative production of
that unit increases. This experience is the basis of the "learning curve" concept that
doubling the cumulative production of a unit results in a cost reduction of a constant per-
centage - the learning factor.
A production run of 100 ACV freighters with a learning factor of 90 percent appli-
cable over the full production run is assumed. However, for the nuclear powerplants a
learning factor of 93 percent applicable only over the first 15 (constant cost thereafter)
is used. This is the value used by the Maritime Administration for marine nuclear pow-
erplants, as cited in reference 26.
Thus, the average cost for a nuclear ACV freighter, accounting for the cost re-
duction obtained by "learning, " would be $49. 5 million.
Operating Costs
ACV freighters that move on ocean routes will have characteristics of both modern
ships and large aircraft. Reference 12 (volume 6 of a series), which is an assessment
of surf ace-effect ships for the American Merchant Marine that in fact uses a cost
methodology based on Air Transportation Association methods, identifies these charac-
teristics for a surf ace-effect ship (SES). (An SES is a hybrid ACV that is restricted
to water; it is also called a Captured Air Bubble (CAB) ship.)
In particular, from reference 12, page 8-1:
"Certain aspects of design, fabrication, and operation of the CAB ship are similar
to those of subsonic transport aircraft. .. The operation of the CAB ship is similar in
some ways to the operation of conventional ships, as well as aircraft. Therefore, the
CAB ship costs used in this study have been extrapolated from each of these sources
where appropriate.''
In both construction and operation, a surface-independent ACV with navigation and
control automated to the extent of a large aircraft should resemble an aircraft even
more than an SES resembles it. Therefore, the operating cost analysis of this ACV
freighter will use information from the SES study (ref. 12) with modifications that ac-
14
count for more recent (since 1965) design and operational data for large ACV's, large
aircraft, and high-speed ships.
To determine vehicle operating costs, it is necessary to choose the load factor and
utilization of the vehicle. Present aircraft, standard-body freighters, have load fac-
tors of about 72 percent (ref. 27). However, the use of larger, wide-bodied aircraft
such as the Boeing 747F or the Lockheed L-500 (civilian version of the military C5A)
with their greater cubic capacity are expected to increase this load factor, perhaps to
85 to 90 percent. Although reference 12 assumed load factors of 75 percent for con-
tiner ships (based on 1965 marine experience), it is believed that the coming generation
of container ships (such as for Sea-Land Services, Inc.) can achieve load factors of
100 percent by using computerized assignment of container location and stowing order
rather than random stowing.
Because of the ACV flat-bed design and removable cargo covers, the use of com-
puterized cargo stowing, and the fact that fewer ACV terminals (relative to ship termi-
nals) would tend to concentrate the cargo, an ACV load factor of 100 percent seems
achievable.
A utilization of 0.6 (5256 hr underway per yr) corresponding to that used in refer-
ence 12 is assumed. At an average speed of about 150 km/hr over a typical trip dis-
tance of 12 000 kilometers, about 65 one-way trips can be made each year. Using a
port staytime of 12 hours (suggested as achievable in ref. 12) the dock time per year
would be about 800 hours. This would leave about 2700 hours a year for major repairs
and maintenance.
The estimated operating costs of a nuclear ACV freighter are given in table III.
A crew of 10 (corresponding to that in ref. 12) will be needed to allow three watches
with a three-man operating crew during the multiday trips. The 10th crew member will
be a steward for food preparation and serving. Each^three-man operating crew will
have a pilot, a navigator, and an engineer who must have nuclear reactor training. The
yearly salary, overtime, and fringe-benefit cost of the 10-man crew will be $350,000;
this is $69,000 greater than the cost assumed in reference 12 to allow for both the
higher salaries needed because of the Arctic duty and the additional nuclear training re-
quired. To provide for crew rotation and shore leave, three complete 10-man crews
will be needed, resulting in a total yearly cost of $1.05 million or about $200 per
operating hour (5256 hr).
The initial insurance cost would probably be relatively high because of the lack of
experience and actuarial data covering such Arctic operations. If ACV freighters oper-
ate successfully and safely for a while, the basic insurance cost should level off at about
$150 per operating hour. This is based on the Boeing 747 experience of $73 per oper-
—fi
ating hour (ref. 28), which is about 3.0x10 times the vehicle capital cost. However,
this factor must be increased to account for the additional Arctic risk and the presence
of nuclear material.
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TABLE HI. - DIRECT OPERATING COSTS OF
NUCLEAR AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER
Crew
Insurance:
Base
Ice risk
Nuclear risk
Maintenance
Capital recovery
Fuel
Total
Cost,
dollars per
operating
• ahour
200
230
150
75
5
2000
2700
1150
6280
Cost,
millions of
dollars per
year
1.05
1.21
10.51
14.20
6.05
33.02
Number of operating hours per year is 5256;
this does not include dock time.
Recovery of capital investment at 25-percent
discount rate (includes profit before taxes
and interest due).
In particular, the North Ice clause generally increases marine insurance by 50 to
100 percent for ships exposed to the hazard of polar ice. Because the ACV will go over
the ice and will have sophisticated navigation and guidance systems on board that will
allow it to easily detour around major ice obstructions, the lower limit of 50 percent is
added to the base insurance cost.
Reference 26 cites nuclear third-party insurance as about $2.40 per displacement
ton per year for container ships. This same unit cost is used for the 9070-metric-ton
(10 000-ton) ACV freighter. Thus, the hourly insurance cost factor is 4.6xlO~ times
the ACV capital cost, and the total yearly insurance cost is about 2.4 percent of the
freighter capital cost. For comparison, insurance on marine vessels may cost from
1 to 3 percent of the capital cost per year.
Extrapolations of maintenance costs (from Bell Aerosystems) for operational ACV's
indicated a minimum cost of $4000 per operating hour for a 9070-metric-ton (10 000-
ton) ACV. This cost is high mainly for two reasons: (1) the susceptibility of the engines
to dirt, sand, ice, or salt spray kicked up by the airflow from the cushion, and (2) high
skirt wear (fatigue caused by constant flapping or flexing of the skirt rather than fric-
tion wear) and the attendant, presently tedious, process of skirt replacement.
For the utilization assumed for the ACV freighters the yearly maintenance cost
would be about 42 percent of the capital cost of a freighter. Even if the overall system
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were cost competitive,this maintenance cost would not likely remain high because of
the substantial extra profit to be gained by reducing it. Furthermore, such a high main-
tenance cost implies substantial ACV downtime for maintenance and, hence, the utiliza-
tion assumed (0.6) might not be achievable.
Therefore, a lower maintenance cost ($2000 per operating hour) is assumed for the
following reasons: (1) to identify the probable degree of cost reduction which must be
achieved in the economically important area of maintenance if the ACV freighter is to
compete for transoceanic cargo, (2) to make the assumed utilization more credible in
view of the implied maintenance downtime, and (3) to account for substantial opportuni-
ties for maintenance cost reduction that are outlined in the following paragraphs.
There are three indications that a much lower maintenance cost can be achieved:
(1) expected maturing of the relatively new technologies of flexible skirts and extensive
particulate filtration for the engines; (2) expected development of special, efficient
skirt-maintenance techniques as ACV's grow in size and applicability; and (3) the ex-
perience of the Bertin Company (France) who operated a 28-metric-ton ACV, the N-300
(ref. 17) for more than 500 hours " with no incident and absolutely no skirt repair."
The Bertin experience was not factored into the extrapolated maintenance cost.
The capital investment in the ACV freighter is assumed to be recovered at a
25-percent discount rate over its lifetime. This is a rate sometimes recommended for
novel, unproved, and hence high-risk programs financed by private industry. A discount
rate simply means that the capital investment should be recovered at a 25-percent rate
(to cover taxes, profit, and interest due), or else the investment should be made else-
where to get that return, or to get a lower return at a lower risk. This compares with
21 percent used in reference 12.
The ACV structure life and the reactor shield'life are assumed to be 15 years; the
ACV machinery life and the reactor structure life are assumed to be 10 years (ref. 8).
The capital recovery factors (fraction of capital costs to be recovered each year) for
25 percent over 10 and 15 years are 0.280 and 0.261.
The unit nuclear fuel cost assumed for this analysis is 50 cents per megawatt
thermal per hour (ref. 8). This corresponds to $12 per gram of uranium-235 and is
equivalent to about 1.7 mills per kilowatt-hour of electrical energy for a nuclear elec-
tric powerplant with a thermal efficiency of 30 percent. The nuclear fuel cost includes
nuclear fuel burnup cost, fuel-element manufacturing costs, fuel reprocessing and ship-
ping costs, and interest charges on unburned nuclear fuel. It is intended to cover all
costs associated with the nuclear fuel cycle.
Thus, the total operating cost per year for a nuclear ACV freighter is $33 million.
The ACV direct operating cost (DOC) will be about 0. 8 cent per metric ton-kilometer
(1. 3 07ton-n mi).
This cost does not include the indirect operating cost (IOC), which aircraft experi-
ence would indicate to be substantial (about 3. 5 cents per metric ton-kilometer (6 eV
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ton-n mi)). However, ACV freighters will likely use modified shipping facilities in
their early stages; and the introduction of a totally new transport form should be more
easily adapted to an automated, efficient, and low-cost cargo processing and handling
system than an established transport form with numerous vested interests, like the air-
craft.
Hence, the IOC for surface-effect ships based on advanced, automated, container-
ized cargo handling is used in table IV (ref. 12). The cargo handling charge (including
loading/unloading and packing/unpacking of containers within the terminals) would be
about 3 percent of the DOC. The terminal and port charges (such as harbor, customs,
and tug fees) are assumed to be 10 percent of the DOC. Overhead allocation (offices;
supplies; and legal, technical, administrative, and sales expenses) is assumed to be
15 percent of the DOC. The total IOC for the ACV freighter would be 28 percent of the
DOC or about 0.2 cent per metric ton-kilometer (0.37 jzf/ton-n mi).
The total operating cost of the nuclear ACV freighter would thus be 1.0 cent per
metric ton-kilometer (1.7 c'/ton-n mi).
TABLE IV. - INDIRECT OPERATION COSTS OF NUCLEAR AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER**
Category
Cargo handling costs
Terminal and port charges
Overhead allocation
Total
Indirect operating
cost, percentage
of direct
operating costs
3
10
15
28
Description
Loading and unloading containers; packing
and unpacking containers (labor, equip-
ment, and stowage charges)
Amortization and operating costs of
specially constructed or modified facilities
for the ACV freighter. Harbor and light
dues, tags, customs fees, and pilotage.
General management expenses including
office space; supplies; and legal, technical,
and administrative personnel, and sales
expenses.
aFrom ref. 12.
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ARCTIC ROUTES
Two trans-Arctic ACV routes are selected for this study (fig. 11). Exact specifica-
tion of the routes is beyond the scope of this study; hence, only the regional variations
of the routes are shown. One route is a North Polar Passage, which would be followed
when traveling from Europe to the Orient, starting at the Greenwich Meridian (0° longi-
tude), passing to the east of Iceland and Greenland, across the North Pole, and then
turning to about 170° W longitude to go through the Bering Strait. The other route is a
Northwest Passage, which when traveling from the eastern U.S. and Canada, would pass
Newfoundland, go into the Hudson Strait and across the north part of Hudson Bay, across
various channels, bays, and penisulas to the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska, then around
Point Barrow, and through the Bering Strait.
The topography, behavior, and other characteristics (such as hardness and prox-
imity to land) of polar ice are not well known. Although the average ice-ridge height
Archangel
^-•' North
,l\lorth Polar Pole
Passage
CD-11393-02
Figure 11. - Air-cushion-vehicle Arctic routes.
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above the surface of the polar ice seems to be between 1 and 2 meters, occasional wind-
driven pressure ridges may reach heights of nearly 7 meters (23 ft) and ice "verticals"
(upended ice slabs) may reach 20 to 30 meters (65 to 100 ft). Thus, before commercial
ACV routes across the Arctic can be selected, the Arctic ice must be thoroughly mapped
and its behavior much better understood.
Based on the present knowledge of the general characteristics of the Arctic ice and
if we assume that further Arctic studies, while uncovering the details, will confirm
these general characteristics, the conceptual ACV freighter in this study should be satis-
factory. The 6-meter-high flexible skirt and reduced over-ice speed (110 km/hr, or
60 knots) should be adequate for average ice conditions. Sophisticated obstacle-detection
and navigation systems should allow the ACV freighter to detour around major obstruc-
tions and seek a path which will "follow" acceptable ice conditions. Thus, exact ACV
trade routes through the Arctic, especially across the polar ice, might be chosen as a
trip progresses.
Substantially different routes might be desirable to permit off-loading cargo from
conventional ships to ACV's for the Arctic (or ice) crossing and then transferring the
cargo back to another displacement ship waiting in ice-free water at the other side of
the ice pack. This is a form of the "landbridge" discussed in the next section. Cargo
transfer would occur at ports just south of the severe ice regions; for example, Nome,
Alaska; St. Johns, Newfoundland; or perhaps somewhere on Greenland, Iceland, the
Aleutians, or the Spitzbergen Islands. This cargo transfer technique might be used
initially with first-generation chemically fueled ACV's making a nonstop Arctic cross-
ing. Of if it were practical to use chemical ACV's for the entire port-to-port trip then
the "cargo transfer ports" would be refueling stations.
Economic trade-off studies (beyond the scope of this study) of displacement ship
fleet and chemical ACV fleet size, scheduling, operating costs, and transfer port costs
could determine whether such a cargo transfer process or refueling stations might be
feasible.
COMPARISON TO CONVENTIONAL EAST-WEST
FREIGHT TRANS PORT
In order to judge its freight-hauling characteristics fairly, the nuclear ACV using
Arctic passages must be compared to conventional vehicles that will likely be plying
East-West trade routes in the same time period that the nuclear ACV could be, 1985
to 2000.
Table V compares several typical productivity and power characteristics of an
existing supertanker, an existing oil-fired container ship, a next-generation (nuclear)
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TABLE V. - COMPARISON OF FREIGHT-CARRIERS ON EAST-WEST ROUTES
Pay load, metric tons(tons)
Cruising speed, km/hr (knots)
Load factor
Work capacity,0 metric ton-km(ton-n mi)
Route length, km(n mi)
Delivery rate,0 metric ton/hr(ton/hr)
Power, kW(hp)
Ratio of power to pay load, W/metric ton(hp/ton)
Ratio of energy to payload capacity, kg/fuel metric
ton-km(lb fuel/ton-n mi)
Supertanker
180000
(200 000)
29.6(16)
1.0
5 320 000
(3 200 000)
35 200
d(19 000)
151(168)
37.3
(50 000)
0.21(0.25)
0.0015
(0.0055)
Container ship
Oil fired
18000
(20 000)
38.8(21)
1.0
700 000
(420 000)
22 200
(12 000)
31.5(35)
23.8
(32 000)
1.3(1.6)
0.0073
(0.027)
Nuclear
27 000
(30 000)
61(33)
1.0
1 640 000
(990 000)
22 200
(12 000)
74(83)
112
(150 000)
4.2(5.0)
0.014
(0.053)
Aircraft
108
a(120)
835(450)
0.85
76 500
(46 000)
10 200
a(5500)
67.0(7.7)
149
(200 000)
1380(1670)
0.35
(1.3)
Nuclear
ACV
5400
(6000)
b!48(80)
1.0
800 000
(480 000)
12 900
(7000)
62(69)
567
(760 000)
105(126)
0.12
(0.44)
aAt 6500-km (3500-n mi) range the Lockheed L-500 payload is about 120 metric tons; the Boeing 747F payload
is about 100 metric tons. For North Atlantic-Or lent flights, it is assumed these aircraft would make one
refueling stop, probably in Alaska.
ACV speed is 100 knots over water and 60 knots over land and ice, for an average of 80 knots.
clncludes load factors.
Assumes voyage length increases by 12 900 km (7000 n mi) because a supertanker, being too large for the
Panama Canal, must "round the Horn" (southern tip of South America).
eAllows 1 hour for refueling stop.
For comparative purposes, energy consumption for all vehicles including nuclear ones is based on specific
fuel consumption 0.213 kg/kw-hr (0.35 Ib/hp-hr); ACV speed used is (100 knots).
container ship, a large all-cargo aircraft, and a nuclear ACV freighter. (A similar
comparison of small hovercraft to many forms of transport is given in ref. 29.)
The coming generation of oil-fired container ships will be represented by ships that
move at 61 km/hr (33 knots), have a cargo deadweight of about 18 900 metric tons
(21 000 tons), and require 120 000 shaft horsepower. Eight of these ships are on order
for Sea-Land Service, Inc.; the first is to be delivered in August 1972.
Although the eight container ships ordered by Sea-Land are oil fired, the high
power needed for such fast, large container ships should come increasingly from
nuclear powerplants. Nuclear power is now competitive for ship powers above 100 000
shaft horsepower according to the Maritime Administration, which also has projected a
worldwide need for about 500 ships with over 100 000 shaft horsepower by 1990 (ref. 30).
Another projection by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum is that there will be 280 nu-
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clear container ships on the high seas by the year 2000 (ref. 31).
Thus, based on the container ships ordered by Sea-Land, the projections for
nuclear-powered ships, and the work described in reference 26 (British Nuclear Ship
Study), this study assumes the next generation of container ships will be nuclear-
powered, 61-kmAr (33-knot), 27 000-metric-ton- (30 000-ton-) cargo-deadweight,
130 000- to 150 000-shaft-horsepower vessels.
One additional and relatively new means of East-West cargo transport is a hybrid
sea/land mode, the landbridge. The concept of a U.S. landbridge is to include an over-
land link for shipping routes between ports of Europe and the Orient. The landbridge
would be an alternative to the longer all-water route through the Panama Canal. The
procedure would be to transfer containers from a ship to a land carrier (probably rail-
cars) on one U.S. coast (East, West, or Gulf), carry the containers across the country
to another U.S. coast, and then transfer the containers from the railcars to another
ship for completion of the trip.
A derivative of this landbridge, called a mini-landbridge, would involve Western
U.S. - Europe cargo or Eastern U.S. - Japan cargo. The mini-landbridge would offer
a transit time shorter by 5 to 7 days for the same price paid for the all-water Panama
Canal route (ref. 32). This transit shortening is based on current ship speeds (about
20 to 25 knots); with the advent of 33-knot ships the time savings will be 3 to 5 days.
A number of factors, including the newness of the landbridge concept, possible be-
latedness of land carriers in offering landbridge service after many large container
ships are already ordered, and implementation problems arising from the dual nature
(sea/land) of this transport mode (tariffs and rates, regulations, and land carrier
scheduling and capacity) make it difficult to assess the competitiveness and costs of the
landbridge concept or its derivatives.
Therefore, limited to the particular example given from reference 32, only com-
parisons with the mini-landbridge are provided and only then for the charge per cargo
ton and for trip times over the appropriate routes (later in this section).
Table VI lists typical costs per metric ton-kilometer for transporting cargo on
various trans-oceanic carriers. The cost for the coming generation of 33-knot, oil-
fired container ships and the cost for the nuclear container ships are assumed to remain
the same as the present container ship cost. The cost increase due to higher power
(needed for higher speed) is offset by cost decreases due to the "economy of size" ob-
tained because of the large cargo deadweight and due to the use of nuclear power
(ref. 30). The nuclear ACV cost would thus be about 20 percent more than the nuclear
container ship costs.
For an additional comparison, aircraft costs are shown, based on projected
Lockheed L-500 costs (ref. 33) and a load factor of 85 percent. The payload is approxi-
mately that of an L-500 at 6 500-kilometer (3500-n mi) range, appropriate to East-West
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TABLE VI. - COST COMPARISON OF MODES OF CARRYING
TRANSOCEANIC CARGO
Supertanker (oil fired)a
Container ship (oil fired)
Container ship (nuclear)0
ACV (nuclear)d
Aircraft6
Operating costs,
cents/metric ton-km
(cents/ton-n mi)
Direct
0.8(1.3)
2.1(3.5)
Indirect
0.2(0.4)
3.5(5.9)
Total
0.020(0.034)
0.84(1.4)
0.84(1.4)
1.0(1.7)
5.6(9.4)
From ref. 4; indirect and direct costs not available.
Existing oil-fired container ship.
Anticipated nuclear-powered container ship in the 1980's.
Relative to existing container ship, the cost increase due to
higher power needed (for higher speed) is assumed to be off-
set by the cost decrease offered by the large cargo dead-
weight and by the use of nuclear power.
Indirect operating costs are 28 percent of direct operating costs,
based on ref. 12 (table IV).
eBased on 85-percent load factor, data from table V, and projected
costs for Lockheed L-500 from ref. 33.
trips with one refueling stop, probably in Alaska. Although a supersonic transport
could be available in the 1985-2000 time period, it is not considered here.
Based on the comparative operating costs in table VI, a nuclear ACV will most
directly compete with nuclear-powered container ships. But the cost per metric ton-
kilometer is not a complete indicator of East-West shipping costs because of the great
difference in route length used by the ACV and ship.
Table VII lists the estimated displacement ship and ACV route distances between
selected Atlantic and Pacific ports. The ship distances were derived from reference 34;
the ACV distances were obtained from map measurements. The distance savings by
using the northern trans-Arctic passages shows why they have been sought for so long.
For example, trading distance between London and Tokyo would decrease by about 10 350
kilometers (5600 n mi), between London and San Francisco by about 2220 kilometers
(1200 n mi), and between New York and Tokyo by about 3610 kilometers (1950 n mi). Re-
opening the Suez Canal would slightly reduce the London-Tokyo savings to about 9250
kilometers (5000 n mi). The table also shows that the ship route through the Panama
Canal is shorter than the ACV route for trips between the east and west coasts of the
U.S.
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TABLE VII. - COMPARISON OF APPROXIMATE DISTANCES BETWEEN PORTS
Mode
Ship3
ACV
Route
Suez Canal
North Polar Passage
Origin
London
London
Savings
Ship3
ACV
Panama Canal
North Polar Passage
London
London
Savings
Ship3
ACV
Panama Canal
Northwest Passage
New York
New York
Savings
Destination
Tokyo Shanghai San Francisco
Approximate distance between ports, km(n mi)
21 555(11 650)
12 340(6670)
9215(4980)
22 720(12 280)
12 340(6670)
10 380(5610)
17965(9710)
14 365(7765)
3600(1945)
19 610(10 600)
14 465(7820)
5145(2780)
24 355(13 165)
14 465(7820)
9890(5345)
19 580(10 585)
16 490(8915)
3090(1670)
12 245(6620)
14 500(7840)
12 245(6620)
2255(1220)
9740(5265)
14 270(7715)
(b)
3From ref. 34.
Route through Northwest Passage is longer by 4530 km(2450 n mi).
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TABLE VHI. - COMPARISON OF CHARGE PER CARGO METRIC TON
Mode
Ship
ACV
Ship/rail
Ship
ACV
Ship/rail
Railc'd
Truck0 ' e
Route
Suez Canal
Panama Canal
North Polar Passage
Landbridge
Panama Canal
Northwest Passage
Landbridge
Origin
Lone
i
New
on
York
Destination
Tokyo Shanghai San Francisco
Charge per metric tona, dollars
180
190
125
150
145
150
165
205
145
165
165
165
120
120
120
80
145
35
110
aShip cost is 0. 84 cent per metric ton-kilometer (1. 4c'/ton-n mi). ACV cost
is 1.0 cent per metric ton-kilometer (1.7e'/ton-n mi).
These charges are for the mini-landbridge concept, wherein overland
transport by rail across the U.S. is used (for cargo originating or
terminating in U.S.) instead of the all-water route through the
Panama Canal (ref. 32).
cBased on New York - San Francisco highway distance of 4850 kilometers
(3011 s mi) from ref. 34.
Rail cost of about 0.75 cent per metric ton-kilometer (l.le'/ton-s mi)
assumes unit train piggyback configuration with 100 percent load factor
(ref. 35).
eTruck cost of about 2.3 cents per metric ton-kilometer (3.3^/ton-s mi)
obtained from ref. 35.
Table VIII compares the charge per metric ton of transporting cargo by nuclear
ACV and by nuclear container ship between the selected ports of the North Atlantic and
North Pacific listed in table VII, using costs taken from table VI. The mini-landbridge
transport mode charges, the same as by way of the Panama Canal, are also shown. Be-
tween Europe and the Orient the ACV charge per cargo metric ton would be as much as
30 percent less than the ship charge. Between Europe and the western U.S. and be-
tween the Orient and the eastern U.S. the charge would be about the same. But between
the eastern and western U.S. coasts the ACV charge would be almost twice the ship
charge.
For added information, table VIII includes the charge for New York - San Francisco
freight transport by rail and by truck. These charges are based on a distance of 4850
kilometers (3011 statute miles (s mi)) and costs of 2.3 cents per metric ton-kilometer
(S.Se'/ton-s mi) for trucks and 0.75 cent per metric ton-kilometer (l.le'/ton-s mi) for
rail (ref. 35).
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Existing container ships can cruise at 37 to 46 km/hr (about 20 to 25 knots); the
anticipated generation of nuclear container ships will cruise at 61 km/hr (33 knots); the
nuclear ACV's would cruise at 185 km/hr (100 knots) at sea and 110 km/hr (60 knots)
over the Arctic ice and tundra for an approximate average ACV speed of 148 km/hr
(80 knots). The trip times are compared in table IX using the distances from table VII
and allowing 8 hours for the Panama transit. Going by ACV, about 12 days is saved for
Europe-Orient trips (with the Suez Canal closed) and about 7 days for New York - Orient
or London - San Francisco trips. For New York - San Francisco trips, about 3 days
would be saved, although the charge would be nearly twice as much by ACV as by ship
(table VIII).
Table IX also shows trip times for the mini-landbridge mode where appropriate.
Even with the 33-knot container ships, the mini-landbridge would still take 2 to 5 days
longer than the ACV mode.
TABLE IX. - COMPARISON OF TRIP TIMES
Mode
Shipb
ACV*
Route
Suez Canal
North Polar Passage
Origin
London
London
Savings
Shipb'c
Ship/rail
ACV^
Panama Canal
Landbridge
North Polar Passage
London
London
London
Savings - ACV over landbridge
Savings - ACV over ship
Shipb'c
Ship/rail
ACV*
Panama Canal
Landbridge6
Northwest Passage
New York
New York
New York
Savings - ACV over landbridge
Savings - ACV over ship
Destination
Tokyo Shanghai San Francisco
Trip time, days
15.1
3.5
11.6
15.8
3.5
12.3
12.6
~9
4.0
8.6
13.7
4.1
9.6
17.0
4.1
12.9
13.7
-10
7.5
-2.5
6.2
10.2
-6
3.4
-2.6
6.8
7.0
4.0
3.0
Distances taken from table VII.
Nuclear container ship with speed of 33 knots.
clncludes 8-hr average Panama Canal transit time.
Average speed, 80 knots.
eMini-landbridge mode, wherein cargo either originates or terminates on
one of the U.S. coasts.
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There is another substantial benefit from shorter trip times. An increasing prob-
lem of shippers is the boredom at sea and the libido and alcoholism ashore that occur
in shipping crews who may be at sea for 24 days and in port for 12 hours. It is in-
creasingly difficult to attract and keep young men in the maritime service because of
the comparative isolation from their families. The use of nuclear container ships with
their higher speed would reduce the time at sea to about 12 days for similar voyages.
If the landbridge were used, the cargo trip time might be reduced to 10 days, and the
vessel and crew at-sea time would be reduced even further by the cross-country time of
2 to 3 days. However, the use of ACV freighters on Arctic passages would still offer
the shortest at-sea time, between 3 and 8 days.
ELIGIBLE CARGO
The speed, low cost, and flat-bed design of this ACV freighter make it well-suited
to carry the containerized and roll-on/roll-off cargo now handled by ships and to carry
wholly new types and configurations of cargo. However, supertankers and bulk/ore
carriers will continue to transport inexpensive bulk cargos such as oil, liquified natural
gas, grain, and ores between present sources and markets much more cheaply than a
nuclear ACV could.
In a roll-on/roll-off mode (fig. 12) this ACV freighter could carry cars, tractors,
road construction machinery, recreation vehicles, mobile homes, and trailer trucks and
carry them to and from new ports that could never be reached by ships. It could trans-
port large preloaded pallets of machinery or appliances fast enough to allow expensive
inventories of imported goods to be reduced. ACV's could carry modular, prefabri-
cated, and preoutfitted building units (fig. 13). A building unit might be a factory,
equipment service center, educational center, hospital, barracks, field kitchen, or
temporary office.
Table X lists some families of products that are presently "air eligible," that is,
products having a value of at least $2.20 per kilogram ($1.00/lb) that now move long
distances by air (ref. 36). The table also lists some products that would become air
eligible if the total air-cargo cost were reduced by 25 to 35 percent. The nuclear ACV
freighter described in this study could carry cargo at about one-fifth the projected cost
by air freighter. Hence, all the products listed in table X would be ACV-eligible.
The nuclear ACV can provide as much as 80 percent of the time savings of jet air-
craft over ships on trips between the North Atlantic and the Orient for one-fifth the cost
of aircraft transport. Because of this speed, several categories of "perishables, "
including monthly newsprint, fresh and prepared foods, cut flowers, competitive pro-
ducts, and short-lived chemical compounds, might be carried by ACV.
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TABLE X. - CARGO CATEGORIES THAT COULD BE HANDLED BY
AIR-CUSHION FREIGHTER'a
Products presently
air-eligible <
(value, $1.43 to $2.20Ag
($0.65 to $1.00/lb))
Refrigerators
Automobiles
Air conditioners
Stoves
Clothes washers
Dishwashers
Products that could become air-
eligible at reduced rates
(value, greater than
$2.20Ag($1.00/lb))
Electronic data processing equipment
Finished apparel
Optical equipment
Hi-fi equipment
Transistor radios
From ref. 36-
Only highly valuable or highly perishable cargo should remain the exclusive domain
of air freighters. Examples of this type of cargo are jewelry, cosmetics, daily news-
print, and small-lot highly competitive products for initial disclosure or demonstration
(such as fashion clothing and electronic or optical instruments).
Those categories of cargo that are ACV-eligible from a vehicle standpoint must now
be compared with the categories that are eligible from a trade-need standpoint.
Table XI lists some of the potential imports and exports of the North Atlantic and
Oriental countries (refs. 37 to 41). The table includes commodities (marked by an
asterisk) that would usually not be ACV-eligible, mostly bulk or liquid raw materials
or feed grains. These commodities are included for completeness and because they may
be key parts of trade agreements which would generate the flow of ACV-eligible goods.
Table XI can be generalized for ACV-eligible cargo in this way: The North Atlantic
countries will export the products, tools, and machines of technology and import from
the Orient both technology products and handcrafted products. From table XI there
seems sufficient need for imports and exports of ACV-eligible cargo in both the North
Atlantic and the Orient to assure a two-way flow. Thus, "back-haul" cargo should not
be a problem.
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TABLE XI. - EXAMPLES OF EAST-WEST TRADE POSSIBILITIES3
Country or region Exports Imports
North Atlantic Chemicals
Alcohol
Fertilizer
Northern beet sugar
Frozen fish (Newfoundland)
Pulpwood (Canada)
Automobiles
Electronic equipment (Boston)
Calculators and computers
Machinery and machine tools
*Ore concentrates (Sweden and Norway)
* Grain (wheat, corn, and soybeans)
Automobiles
Rubber
Paper and metal products
Textiles
Peoples Republic of China Bristles
Edible and inedible oils
Textiles
* Tungsten
* Antimony
*Tin
Railroad equipment
Aircraft and parts
Trucks
Consumer goods
U.S.S.R. Chemicals
Diamonds
*Oil
*Gas
*Iron ore
* Chromium
* Lumber
* Copper
Machinery and equipment
for such industries _as -
Construction
Agriculture
Air conditioning and heating
Oil and gas
Food and data processing
Car and truck parts
Furniture making
Japan Automobiles and motorcycles
Steel
Chemicals
Cameras
Heavy machinery
Computers and electronic components
Plywood products
Precision instruments
Cotton and synthetic textiles
Textile machinery
Television sets
Foodstuffs (meats, sugar)
Wool
* Corn and wheat
Oil
Industrial raw materials
(coal, iron ore, nonferrous
metal ores)
Commodities following an asterisk will not usually be ACV eligible.
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POTENTIAL IMPACT
All mechanized or industrialized countries must trade: they must export what they
can to acquire capital in order to import the services, machinery, products, and raw
materials they need. The coupling of national economies is becoming more pronounced
as more and more countries, seeking to raise their standard of living, change from
agrarian to mechanized to industrialized societies. Arctic passages would offer a
shortcut trade route between most of the major industrial and population centers of the
world.
The potential trade volume between East and West that could go by ACV freighters
on Arctic passages is enormous. The fast-rising industrial and economic power of
Japan (refs. 38 and 40) is already generating substantial trade demand. With diplo-
matic and trade restrictions being eased, the Peoples Republic of .China offers an un-
tapped market of 750 million consumers (ref. 39). The Soviet Union needs machinery
for many different industries (ref. 37). In the West, Europe and the Eastern U.S.
(ref. 41) and Canada offer high-volume trade links, mostly in the products and tools of
technology.
The competitive position of a nuclear ACV trans-oceanic freighter has been pointed
out in references 8 to 10, and 12 to 14, as well as this report. However, in the freight-
carrying business in particular, it is difficult to predict accurately the demand for a new
service, largely because there seems to be no well-defined, complete set of rules for
doing so. On the other hand, it seems clear that the introduction of a vehicle that cuts
East-West trip time to one-third for the same or lower cost should have a revolutionary
effect.
With world ocean-borne trade increasing at 4 percent per year (fig. 2), there is an
increasing opportunity for the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Between 1960 and 1969 only
2.7 percent of 7400 merchant ships built in the world were made in the U.S. (ref. 42).
However, steps have been taken to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry. For ex-
ample, the current Maritime Administration nuclear development program and the re-
cently announced (June 1972) series of federally subsidized ship constructions under the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
The nuclear ACV freighter has the potential to foster the development of both a
large-ACV industry and a mobile-nuclear-powerplant industry in the U.S. for a variety
of uses (refs. 9 to 11, and 43). This freighter could also find a distinct market abroad
and, hence, be an aid to our future balance of payments.
Modern East-West shipping has relied on the Panama and Suez Canals. However,
the Suez has been closed since the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 so that traffic leaving the
North Atlantic that would have used Suez must now go around the Cape of Good Hope,
South Africa, or westward through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific. In fiscal
year 1969, 13 125 ships made the Panama transit, not including 1380 Vietnam-related
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vessels (ref. 44). The Panama Canal, offering its short cut from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, is thus both commercially and strategically important. Arctic passages with
nuclear ACV freighters would offer a less vulnerable alternative. Furthermore, Arctic
passages would also offer an alternative to a sea-level canal proposed as a supplement
to the Panama Canal.
The Arctic is now being recognized as an abundant source of many raw materials,
especially petroleum. Oil has been discovered at Prudhoe Bay in Alaska and at the
MacKenzie River Delta and Ellesmere Island in Canada. The Canadian Arctic Islands
have been estimated to overlie a greater oil deposit than the Middle East (ref. 1). Near
Mary River, a town in the northern part of Baffin Island, lies the largest and richest
iron ore deposit in North America (ref. 2). Natural gas, iron, nickel, lead, zinc, sil-
ver, copper, and uranium have been discovered in the Canadian Arctic. The U.S.S.R.
has enormous oil, gas, and mineral reserves in Siberia.
As pointed out earlier, ACV's will not economically compete with oil tankers and
bulk/ore carriers on open sea routes from present sources. However, with their poten-
tial Arctic-wide, year-round mobility, ACV's would provide a means of moving raw ma-
terials from remote ice-bound mines and wells to ice-free ports. There the cargo could
be transferred to conventional displacement tankers and bulk/ore carriers. In fact,
ACV's acting as oil tankers could serve as a high-speed fuel distribution system to
allow use of Arctic oil during times of national emergency. The possibility of using
ACV's configured as tankers to carry oil over the polar ice from the North Slope of
Alaska around Point Barrow and south to a displacement tanker waiting in ice-free water
has been described in reference 43.
The presence of vast mineral and fuel resources in the Arctic plus its potential
(using ACV freighters) as a trade route between North Pacific and North Atlantic ports
may be the prelude to settlement and development of the Arctic. The nuclear ACV
would provide the heavy-duty transportation needed to develop or operate in this remote
and hostile region. It would offer fuel autonomy, speed, and Arctic-wide mobility
virtually independent of season, as well as opening the long-sought Northwest Passage
to commercial traffic.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nuclear-powered ACV freighters could open the Northwest Passage and other Arctic
passages to commercial traffic in the time period 1985-2000. The technical and eco-
nomic feasibility of small ACV's has already been demonstrated; and there appear to be
no technical limitations to building large ACV's. The feasibility of lightweight mobile
nuclear powerplants is suggested by development work on nuclear space power systems,
by successful experiments involving high-speed impact of simulated reactor contain-
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ment vessels without rupture, and by analytical studies of optimized shield designs to
minimize weight.
Nuclear ACV freighters may have an operating cost of about 1.0 cent per metric
ton-kilometer (1.7^/ton-n mi). Their flat-bed design would permit them to carry con-
tainers, vehicles, and even modular housing as cargo. Their major competitor for
trade between North Atlantic and North Pacific ports will likely be nuclear-powered
container ships (perhaps using a landbridge).
Some of the incentives for development of a nuclear-powered ACV freighter for a
Northwest Passage are (1) greatly reduced transit time on many East-West trade mis-
sions, (2) competitive cost with conventional shipping for container and roll-on/roll-off
cargo, (3) independence from the Panama and Suez Canals, (4) applicability of the ACV
freighter concept to transportation needs throughout the world, (5) potential world-wide
marketability of the ACV freighter, and (6) the Arctic-wide, all-season mobility of the
freighter which would also allow extraction of the vast mineral and fuel resources of the
Arctic and would stimulate settlement and industrial development there.
Lewis Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Cleveland, Ohio, November 21, 1972,
501-24.
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